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position with respect to the numerous problems relating to civil liability
arising generally from the violation of a statute, and those relating specifi-
cally to a statute similar to the one litigated in the instant case.22 The
court concluded, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, that the entire
section viewed as a whole, was a public safety measure, the violation of
which under the prevailing rule in the state being prima facie evidence of
negligence. However, this, in itself, creates no liability because the injury
must have a "direct and proximate" connection with the violation of the
statute-to be determined by a jury-before liability will be imposed. It
appears that this decision places Illinois among the minority of jurisdic-
tions having adjudicated the question.
In conclusion, it is submitted that imposing civil liability upon the auto-
mobile owner, whether by virtue of his violation of an applicable statute
or by common law negligence, is somewhat incongruous in light of the
recognized principle of agency that when an automobile is used by one to
whom it was loaned, for the borrower's purposes, the lender is not liable
unless, possibly, where the lender knew that the borrower was incom-
petent and that injury might occur because of his incompetency.23 Such
civil liability as is imposed leads to the interesting result that if someone
takes the owner's car with his permission, the owner escapes liability; if
someone takes it without his permission in his absence, the owner is
liable.
WILLS-PAROL EVIDENCE ADMITTED TO SHOW WILL
NOT REVOKED BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
A few days prior to executing his will, testator proposed marriage to a
Mrs. Allison. Married when the proposal was made, Mrs. Allison left for
Reno, Nevada, where she was granted a divorce, marrying testator the day
the decree was granted and returning with him to Illinois where they
lived until his death in 1953. Reversing an order of the County Court
refusing probate to the will on the ground that it was revoked by testa-
tor's marriage, the Circuit Court held that the divorce decree was void for
want of jurisdiction, that testator's marriage was of no effect, and that
the will was therefore not revoked. Testator's son, who received one-
fourth of the estate, appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, where it
was held that while the marriage was valid, it did not revoke the will.1
22111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 952, § 189; note, however, that this section does not have
the exclusionary language found in the Missouri statute.
23Weatherman v. Ramsey, 207 N.C. 270, 176 S.E. 568 (1934).
1 In holding testator's marriage valid, the court rejected the contention that Mrs.
Allison's divorce was null and void because of a lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Nevada court. It was held that the fact that Mrs. Allison's former husband was
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The court said that the gift of one-half the estate to Mrs. Allison was
made with the impending marriage to her in mind, that it was apparent
that testator did not intend to have the will revoked, and that the stat-
utory presumption of revocation because of a subsequent marriage was
rebutted by virtue of the extrinsic evidence as to testator's intent. In re
Estate of Day,, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 131 N.E. 2d 50 (1955).
As it acknowledged, the court overturned several past decisions which
held that the statutory provision that "[m]arriage by the testator shall be
deemed a revocation of any existing will executed by the testator prior to
the date of the marriage ' 2 could only be avoided if the testator provided
in the will for his change in status and indicated that the will was not to
be revoked because of a subsequent marriage to a person named in the
will.3
The court relied heavily upon the pre-statutory case of Tyler v. Ty-
ler,4 where it was held that marriage, "in the absence of facts showing an
intention to die testate,"5 revokes a will made prior to the marriage. In the
Tyler case, it was asserted that the purpose of the rule was to follow the
intent of the testator, and that it would apply only in "the absence of
facts" indicating the testator did not intend to have the will revoked.
Noting that prior to the statute, the presumption that marriage revokes a
prior will could be rebutted by facts dehors the four corners of the will,
the court in the Day case said that the legislature did not intend to change
the law in this respect. Pointing out that the presumption was rebutted
where a beneficiary was referred to in a will as "my intended wife," Mr.
Justice Klingbiel, speaking for a unanimous bench in the Day case,
asserted that there is "no logical reason why it should not be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence that the person named in the will is in fact
testator's intended wife, even though such evidence does not appear by
the terms of the will itself." 7 The court admitted that the purpose of the
represented by his attorney and had an opportunity to contest the jurisdiction pre-
cluded any collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister state.
Since the question of jurisdiction could not be looked into, it was decided that the
decree must be given full faith and credit in Illinois. To support its position, the
court cited: Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
2111. Rev. Star. (1955) c. 3, § 197 (d).
3 Among the overruled cases are: Kuhn v. Bartels, 374 111. 231, 29 N.E. 2d 84 (1940);
Campbell v. McLain, 318 Ill. 610, 149 N.E. 481 (1925); Gillman v. Dressler, 300 111.
175, 133 N.E. 186 (1921); Wood v. Corbin, 296 ill. 129, 129 N.E. 553 (1920); Ford v.
Greenawalt, 292 111. 121, 126 N.E. 555 (1920").
4 19 IM. 151 (1857).
5 Ibid. at 155.
6 Kuhn v. Bartels, 374 Ill. 231, 29 N.E. 2d 84 (1940) at 231.
7 7 111. 2d 348, 357, 131 N.E. 2d 50, 55 (1955).
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legislature was to prevent artificial or questionable revocations, but ob-
served that "it appears unreasonable to ascribe to the legislature an inten-
tion to declare that a revocation by marriage occurs even though it is
evident the testator in fact made the will in contemplation of the mar-
riage."8 The court said that while evidence to rebut the presumption
should be "clear and convincing," there was nothing in the statute requir-
ing that such evidence appear on the face of the will.
The court thus interpreted the statute as raising a rebuttable presump-
tion of revocation, rather than laying down a rule of absolute law which
revokes all wills except those with clauses in them expressly saving them
from revocation by mentioning the impending marriage and the intended
spouse.
Several cases make plain the shifting attitude of the court in regard to
this matter. In Wood v. Corbin, ° the statute was treated as though it laid
down an absolute rule. In that case, testator married two days after
executing his will, leaving a substantial amount of his estate to the woman
he later married. Testator and the legatee were engaged when the will was
executed and there was an understanding between them as to its contents.
Such facual matters did not deter the court as it stated: "It is mere con-jecture to guess at what the intention of the testator may have been after
the marriage. The statute has declared that a marriage shall be deemed a
revocation of a will, and it must have that effect except in the case of a
will which provides on its face for a future marriage and makes provision
for the wife conditioned upon such marriage taking place.""
However, in Ford v. Greenawalt,12 the court ruled that a will was not
revoked where it provided that in case the contemplated marriage be-
tween the testator and a woman named in the will should occur and she
should survive him, she should get certain bequests. It was declared that it
would be unreasonable to ascribe to the General Assembly an intent to
declare that a revocation by the testator takes place where he provides for
the new relation and "plainly intends that the instrument shall continue to
be his will after the marriage."' 3 In McAnnulty v. McAnnulty,' 4 after
conceding that at common law evidence was admitted to rebut the pre-
sumption that marriage and birth of issue operated to revoke a prior will,
the court asserted "[i]f the statute of 1872 is to have any effect at all
... [it] must operate, per se, as a revocation of a prior will. . ... ,5
The cases thus define the limits the court imposed upon itself whenever
it adhered to the proposition that evidence to rebut the presumption of
revocation must appear on the face of the will. They also record the
8Ibid. 12292 Il. 121, 126 N.E. 555 (1920).
9 Ibid. 13 Ibid. at 126 and 556.
10296 M. 129, 129 N.E. 553 (1920). 14120 III. 26, 11 N.E. 397 (1887).




vacillation that has characterized the court's efforts to arrive at a more
tenable position. 6 It would seem, then, that any reasonable construction
of the statute, as well as the rationale of some of the previous decisions,
supports the result in the Day case, however reluctant they were to
achieve a similar result.
In the first place, the chief purpose of the rule as applied at common
law was to protect the testator's intention. This position is amply sup-
ported by the cases,17 and by such celebrated authority as Chancellor
Kent.18 The statutory change of 1872 has been recognized as having
adopted the principle, if not entirely the letter, of the common law rule.
This was recognized in Ford v. Greenawalt,9 where it was said that
[t]he statute declares that a subsequent marriage shall be deemed a revocation
of a will, which means that the act of the testator in entering into the new
relation shall be considered ... as a recalling of his will .... It is not improbable
that the General Assembly had in mind . . . [the] lack of provision for the
changed condition arising from a subsequent marriage and intended only to
change the existing law by eliminating the condition that there should be no
issue of the marriage.20
If the protection of the assumed intention of the testator is the reason
for the rule, and if it can be shown by "clear and convincing" 21 evidence
that the testator did not want the will revoked, what reason can there be
for so holding it revoked when the statute declares a subsequent marriage
shall only be deemed a revocation of a prior will?
In the recent case of In re Estate of Kent,22 the court recognized the
problem and in a sense anticipated the Day decision. Testator's will was
held revoked because of his subsequent marriage when the statute in force
read: "Marriage by the testator shall revoke any existing will executed by
the testator prior to the date of the marriage." 23 There was an antenuptial
agreement and other evidence indicating that the testator intended for his
lOThe inconsistency of some of the cases is noted in 35 Harv. L. Rev. 95 (1921).
17 In Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk. 592 (1795), 1 Ld Raym. 441 (1792), it was said that
marriage and the birth of children following the making of a will amount to "cir-
cumstances so different at the time of [testator's] death from what they were when
he made his will, here was room and presumptive evidence to believe a revocation,
and that testator continued not of in the same mind." See Brown v. Scherrer, 5 Colo.
App. 255, 38 Pac. 427 (1894); In re Hulett's Estate, 66 Minn. 338, 69 N.W. 31 (1896);
McAnnulty v. McAnnulty, 120 I11. 26, 11 N.E. 397 (1887).
Is Kent Comm. 522. "[T]here is not, perhaps, any code of civilized jurisprudence,
in which this doctrine of implied revocation does not exist, and apply when the oc-
currence of new social relations and moral duties raises a necessary presumption of a
change of intention in the testator."
19 292 Ill. 121, 126 N. E. 555 (1920). 20 Ibid. at 125 and 126.
21 In re Estate of Day, 7 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 131 N.E. 2d 50, 55 (1955).
224 Ill. 2d 81, 122 N.E. 2d 229 (1954). 23111. Laws 1939, § 46, p. 4.
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will to remain in force after the marriage. The court ruled that under the
statute then in force, marriage per se revoked the will, but asserted that
under the present statute, including the words "be deemed,' 24 the legisla-
tive intent was to create a principle of "presumptive revocation." 25 The
court said that if the testator "by some clear and positive act, being mind-
ful of entering into a marriage, evinces an intention that his last will shall
remain in force and effect," then the will would not be revoked. 26
What was meant by "clear and positive act" was not set out, but it was
not equated with the test requiring testator to show on the face of the
will that it is not to be revoked. Thus, if under the statute not containing
the words "be deemed" marriage is a revocation per se, then a statute
containing the words "be deemed" should operate only as a presumption
of revocation.
Because of the diversity of language existing in the statutes of the
various states in regard to revocation of wills by a subsequent marriage,
it is difficult to state exactly where Illinois stands in relation to those
jurisdictions that have considered the problem. A number of the cases
have held that where the will fails to mention the intended spouse of the
testator or fails to indicate that it was made in contemplation of marriage,
it is revoked as to the spouse.27 Indeed, some courts have ruled that men-
tion of the intended spouse in some other status without indication of the
future relationship is sufficient to revoke the will. 28 However, there have
been decisions which appear to support the position of the Illinois court
in the Day case. 20
Considering, then, the language of the Illinois statute, its present con-
struction by the court recognizes the raison d'etre of the act, and at the
same time gives the statutory words their apparent value. It is conceivable
that the certainty of the old decisions will be missed and that the test of
"clear and convincing evidence" may prove troublesome. But few, it is
hoped, will lament the passing of the anomalous situation Where a single
24 Statute cited note 3 supra.
25 In re Estate of Kent, 4 111. 2d 81, 83, 133 N.E. 2d 229, 230 (1954).
26 Ibid. at 83 and 230.
27 In re Stark, 52 Ariz. 416, 82 Pac. 2d 894 (1938); In re Eustace, 198 Wash. 142, 87
Pac. 2d 305 (1939); In re Haselbud, 26 Cal. App. 2d 345, 79 Pac. 2d 443 (1938); In re
Smith, 15 Cal. App. 2d 548, 59 Pac. 2d 854 (1936).
28Barlow v. Barlow, 233 Mass. 468, 124 N.E. 285 (1919); Ingcrsoll v. Hopkins, 170
Mass. 401, 49 N. E. 623 (1898); In re Scolpino, 231 App. Div. 690, 248 N.Y.S. 634
(2nd Dep't, 1931); In re Mosher, 143 Misc. 149, 256 N.Y.S. 235 (Surr. Ct., 1932); In re
Bent, 142 Misc. 811, 255 N.Y.S. 538 (Surr. Ct., 1932).
29In re Adler, 52 Wash. 539, 100 Pac. 1019 (1909); In re Neufeld, 145 Misc. 442
260 N.Y.S. 302 (Surr. Ct. 1932); In re De Coppet, 142 Misc. 816, 255 N.Y.S. 544
(Surr. Ct., 1932), aff'd. 237 App. Div. 810, 260 N.Y.S. 990 (1st Dcp't, 1932); In re Ap-
penfelder, 99 Cal. App. 330, 278 Pac. 473 (1929).
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sentence in a will had greater legal effect than a succession of undisputed
utterances and acts by the testator which clearly evidenced his intention.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY OCCURRING
DURING PARTICIPATION IN INTRA-COMPANY
SOFTBALL LEAGUE GAME HELD
COMPENSABLE
Claimant sustained serious accidental injuries while playing softball with
a team of company employees in an intra-company league competition
game played after the hours of employment and off the employer's prem-
ises in a public ball park. At the request of the employees, the employer
cooperated in the program by furnishing balls, bats, and T-shirts with
the name "Jewel Food Stores" on the back. Team awards and trophies
were presented by company executives at a special banquet held by the
company. Information about the games was reported in the company pub-
lications distributed to the employees, and on the company operated FM
radio station to the company stores before they were opened to the pub-
lic. The Jewel personnel chief testified that the games were encouraged
and used to promote the health, welfare, and happiness of the employees,
a condition advantageous and desirable both for the employees and for
the company because it furthered the joint effort. Participation in the
league was voluntary and without pay, nor was there any time off
granted from work for practice. The Superior Court of Cook County set
aside an award entered by the Industrial Commission against the employer.
On certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court of Illinois, Justice Maxwell
dissenting, held that the injuries were compensable as arising out of and in
the course of employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. Jewel Tea Company, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 6 Ill.
2d 304, 128 N.E. 2d 699, and 128 N.E. 2d 928 (dissenting opinion) (1955).
For an injury to be compensable under the usual Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, it must "arise out of" and "in the course of" the employment.
Since the phrases are used conjunctively, there must be a concurrence of
both elements for an accident to be compensable. 1 The Act is not applied
to every accidental injury which might occur to an employee during his
employment, and the employer is not an insurer of his employees at all
times during employment. 2 Each case is decided on its own particular
circumstances. 3 The burden is on the plaintiff to show by positive evi-
dence, or by evidence from which the inference can fairly and reasonably
1 Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill., 279 Ill. 11, 116 N.E. 684 (1917).
2 Klug v. Indus. Comm., 381 Ill. 608, 46 N.E. 2d 38 (1943).
:3 Figgins v. Indus. Comm., 379 111. 75, 39 N.E. 2d 353 (1942).
